EXPLAINING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CONNECTICUT’S RFRA LAW AND INDIANA’S RFRA LAW TO CONSERVATIVES


diane_tomlinson_2

It’s been a tough week for conservatives. Our eternal adversaries on the Right have made some recent comments about how Connecticut Governor Daniel P. Malloy is being hypocritical because Connecticut has a RFRA law. Here is a simple explanation and comparison that even conservatives can understand.

Here is the Connecticut RFRA Law [emphasis mine]:

Sec. 52-571b. Action or defense authorized when state or political subdivision burdens a person’s exercise of religion.

(a) The state or any political subdivision of the state shall not burden a person’s exercise of religion under section 3 of article first of the constitution of the state even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section.

(b) The state or any political subdivision of the state may burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.

(c) A person whose exercise of religion has been burdened in violation of the provisions of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against the state or any political subdivision of the state.

(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize the state or any political subdivision of the state to burden any religious belief.

(e) Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect, interpret or in any way address that portion of article seventh of the constitution of the state that prohibits any law giving a preference to any religious society or denomination in the state. The granting of government funding, benefits or exemptions, to the extent permissible under the constitution of the state, shall not constitute a violation of this section. As used in this subsection, the term “granting” does not include the denial of government funding, benefits or exemptions.

(f) For the purposes of this section, “state or any political subdivision of the state” includes any agency, board, commission, department, officer or employee of the state or any political subdivision of the state, and “demonstrates” means meets the burdens of going forward with the evidence and of persuasion.

Okay, the word state appears a lot in that doesn’t it? Here’s the Indiana RFRA Law:

.
SENATE ENROLLED ACT No. 101
AN ACT to amend the Indiana Code concerning civil procedure.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Indiana:
SECTION 1. IC 34-13-9 IS ADDED TO THE INDIANA CODE AS
A
NEW
CHAPTER TO READ AS FOLLOWS [EFFECTIVE JULY
1, 2015]:
Chapter 9. Religious Freedom Restoration
Sec. 1. This chapter applies to all governmental entity statutes,
ordinances, resolutions, executive or administrative orders,
regulations, customs, and usages, including the implementation or
application thereof, regardless of whether they were enacted,
adopted, or initiated before, on, or after July 1, 2015.
Sec. 2. A governmental entity statute, ordinance, resolution,
executive or administrative order, regulation, custom, or usage
may not be construed to be exempt from the application of this
chapter unless a state statute expressly exempts the statute,
ordinance, resolution, executive or administrative order,
regulation, custom, or usage from the application of this chapter by
citation to this chapter.
Sec. 3. (a) The following definitions apply throughout this
section:
(1) “Establishment Clause” refers to the part of the First
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States or the
Constitution of the State of Indiana prohibiting laws
SEA 101 — Concur
2
respecting the establishment of religion.
(2) “Granting”, used with respect to government funding,
benefits, or exemptions, does not include the denial of
government funding, benefits, or exemptions.
(b) This chapter may not be construed to affect, interpret, or in
any way address the Establishment Clause.
(c) Granting government funding, benefits, or exemptions, to the
extent permissible under the Establishment Clause, does not
constitute a violation of this chapter.
Sec. 4. As used in this chapter, “demonstrates” means meets the
burdens of going forward with the evidence and of persuasion.
Sec. 5. As used in this chapter, “exercise of religion” includes
any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to,
a system of religious belief.
Sec. 6. As used in this chapter, “governmental entity” includes
the whole or any part of a branch, department, agency,
instrumentality, official, or other individual or entity acting under
color of law of any of the following:
(1) State government.
(2) A political subdivision (as defined in IC 36-1-2-13).
(3) An instrumentality of a governmental entity described in
subdivision (1) or (2), including a state educational institution,
a body politic, a body corporate and politic, or any other
similar entity established by law.
Sec. 7. As used in this chapter, “person” includes the following:
(1) An individual.
(2) An organization, a religious society, a church, a body of
communicants, or a group organized and operated primarily
for religious purposes.
(3) A partnership, a limited liability company, a
corporation,
a company, a firm, a society, a joint-stock company, an
unincorporated association, or another entity
that:
(A) may sue and be sued; and
(B) exercises practices that are compelled or limited by a
system of religious belief held by:
(i) an individual; or
(ii) the individuals;
who have control and substantial ownership of the entity,
regardless of whether the entity is organized and operated for
profit or nonprofit purposes.
Sec. 8. (a) Except as provided in subsection (b), a governmental
entity may not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion,
SEA 101 — Concur
3
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.
(b) A governmental entity may substantially burden a person’s
exercise of religion only if the governmental entity demonstrates
that application of the burden to the person:
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.
Sec. 9. A person whose exercise of religion has been
substantially burdened, or is likely to be substantially burdened, by
a violation of this chapter may assert the violation or impending
violation as a claim or defense in a judicial or administrative
proceeding, regardless of whether the state or any other
governmental entity is a party to the proceeding. If the relevant
governmental entity is not a party to the proceeding, the
governmental entity has an unconditional right to intervene in
order to respond to the person’s invocation of this chapter.
Sec. 10. (a) If a court or other tribunal in which a violation of
this chapter is asserted in conformity with section 9 of this chapter
determines that:
(1) the person’s exercise of religion has been substantially
burdened, or is likely to be substantially burdened; and
(2) the governmental entity imposing the burden has not
demonstrated that application of the burden to the person:
(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and
(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest;
the court or other tribunal shall allow a defense against any party
and shall grant appropriate relief against the governmental entity.
(b) Relief against the governmental entity may include any of
the following:
(1) Declaratory relief or an injunction or mandate that
prevents, restrains, corrects, or abates the violation of this
chapter.
(2) Compensatory damages.
(c) In the appropriate case, the court or other tribunal also may
award all or part of the costs of litigation, including reasonable
attorney’s fees, to a person that prevails against the governmental
entity under this chapter.
Sec. 11. This chapter is not intended to, and shall not be
construed or interpreted to, create a claim or private cause of action against any private employer by any applicant, employee, or
former employee.

Two things. First look at the difference in how Indiana treats a person. This bill is set up to protect the commerce of bigots. And, two, look at Connecticut and the clear protection against state interference not commercial interference in civil religious rights. Finally unlike Indiana, Connecticut has protections for the LGBT community codified in law–in 1991. So no conservative hack 18 of the 19 other states do not have RFRAs like Indiana or Arkansas. I wonder if ALEC had any input on those two? Malloy isn’t a dumb ass you are Neocon1 because you refuse to do your homework.

Qu’ul cuda praedex nihil!

Diane Valencen, D.S.V.J., CS, O.Q.H [Journ.], ArF J., M.F.
Editorial Page Editor
The Dis Brimstone Daily Pitchfork
171 Melnar 3 AS

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